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The Shifting Dynamics of International Reserve Currencies
Abstract
With the recognition by the IMF of the Chinese renminbi as an international reserve currency in 2015, it is
important to understand the modern influence of reserve currencies. We use currency exchange rate data
and apply modified workhorse regression models to assign each country’s gross domestic product at
purchasing power parity to a reserve currency bloc in order to obtain a global sphere of influence for each
reserve currency. We find that the United States retains its dominance but faces challenges from the
renminbi and the euro in recent years as the international monetary system becomes tri-polar.
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Introduction
A. Statement of Purpose
The purpose of this paper is to investigate the relative decline of the United States
dollar (USD) as a reserve currency. In particular, we want to quantify the use of
the renminbi (RMB) as an upcoming reserve currency and predict its future
impact. Our work seeks to provide an updated view of the international monetary
system and compare these results to what previous researchers have found. This is
extremely important as the Chinese currency has gained more recognition in
recent years, there has been a very large increase in Chinese investments and
trade, and there has been a shifting political climate globally.
B. Background
Leading up to the 1950’s the United States did not have the dominant reserve
currency. Great Brittan held this distinction. As seen in Figure 1, that changed
drastically and the dollar has been dominant ever since. However, in recent years
we have seen a rise in other currencies to rival the dollar. This work will
investigate the global influence of the major reserve currencies including the
RMB, and analyze the impacts that a paradigm shift will have on the global
economy.

Figure 1- Currency Composition of Globally Disclosed Foreign Exchange
Reserves in percent.
Source: Eichengreen, Chitu, and Mehl (2016)
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Reserve currencies are held by countries’ central banks in order to be used
in international transactions. This includes investments and debt obligations. They
are also used to manage exchange rates. Reserve currencies have long been
studied to gain a better understanding of international finance and trade.
Throughout most of the modern day history of the international monetary system
the United States has played a dominant role. There are large economic
implications for the United States having the dominant reserve currency. One
such implication is that there is a very high demand for the USD and countries
have a significant interest in seeing the dollar do well. The US has what is known
as “exorbitant privilege;” that is, it will not have a balance of payments problem
as all of its transactions are done in the USD. In addition, since the United States
controls the money supply, it benefits from seigniorage or the value gained by
minting money. However, there are some negatives associated with being the
dominant reserve currency. This would include increased spending, and possibly
cheaper imports hurting domestic firms. However, being the major reserve
currency is in large part beneficial.
Therefore, it is extremely important to study the international monetary
system and to examine the shifts that occur over time. The international reserve
system as a whole can be criticized with an overreliance on the dollar, and the
United States unfairly taking advantage of the benefits of such a role for the USD.
An example can be seen with the large amounts of spending the United States had
in the Vietnam War, which led to the end of the Bretton Woods system in 1971.
Conversely, the USD can provide stability, liquidity, and safe assets in times of
financial crises. It provides a reliable network and a common currency that most
countries use in international exchanges and transactions.
Despite these arguments, there has been a push for diversification. In fact,
recent years have seen that there has been diversification in the international
monetary system particularly with the rise of the euro leading to a bi-polar
system. We would like to examine China’s role in this increased diversification,
particularly in the years after 2015, when the RMB was officially recognized, by
the IMF, as a reserve currency in a political climate characterized by a Chinese
push for global power and a United States shift toward nationalism in the age of
Trump. As the reserve system shifts to a tri-polar system there are many economic
implications for the United States in terms of its exorbitant privilege.
C. Previous Methods
Much of the work that has previously been published studies the shares and
explicit use of various currencies globally to gauge each currency’s role and
influence. For example Eichengreen, Chitu, and Mehl (2016) analyze network and
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policy effects by looking at the size of the shares of reported reserves. Although
the work does a great job of expanding the data set back in time, there is still little
data for the RMB. That is because the IMF’s reporting of the relevant data for the
RMB began relatively recently. Furthermore, Eichengreen, Chitu, and Mehl show
that there are a lot of holes in IMF reporting, and that despite a relatively good job
of plugging, it still creates problems when combining data sets from various
sources over a long time frame.
This then begs the essential question of this research. How do we
accurately measure the RMB’s influence as a reserve currency in an international
monetary system that has recently shown signs of diversifying? To answer this we
turn to work done by Tovar and Nor (2018) introducing an alternative approach to
measuring the influence of reserve currencies than the typical one found in other
literature. More specifically, calculating the influence that each major currency
bloc has on other currencies. This work, covering data from 1969-2015, will serve
as the foundation for our research as we focus on a more recent time period for
the reasons discussed in the previous sections.
Tovar and Nor study currency co-movements of national currencies with
reserve currencies to determine what reserve currency bloc each national currency
is a part of. It is then possible to calculate the global share of GDP that each
reserve currency influences. The results indicate that the USD is dominant with a
global share of GDP of about 40 percent. Interestingly, this is followed by the
RMB with about a 30 percent share of global GDP. Finally the Euro holds around
20 percent. This indicates that the sphere of influence of the RMB is larger than
otherwise thought in work analyzing reserve currency shares. In addition, the
RMB going into 2015 already has an established influence globally.
In order to calculate each sphere of influence Tovar and Nor built on
Frankel and Weis’s (1994) methodology for analysis using workhorse regressions.
This methodology is argued to have some drawbacks particularly with the fact
that the RMB has been pegged to the USD in the past, which presents a
collinearity problem. So to address these concerns the researchers employ Kawai
and Pontines’ (2016) approach to analyzing the sphere of influence of the RMB.
However, they do this globally and not restricted to Asia.
To measure the global effect the researchers calculated a relative and
absolute sphere of influence for each of the major reserve currency to gather an in
depth look at the historical and recent state of the international monetary system.
This is groundbreaking work that we look to expand upon by incorporating the
most recent three-year period. We will also look to duplicate their results and
corroborate their findings.
The work found that the transition from a bi-polar reserve system to a tripolar system is well underway. However, the USD still, as is the case historically,
plays the dominant role. A lot of the RMB’s influence is attributed to BRICs
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currencies. BRIC refers to Brazil, Russia, India and China. These countries are
grouped because they are at a similar stage of economic development.
Interestingly, the influence of the RMB is more on BRICS currencies as opposed
to playing a central role in Asia. Part of our work will be devoted to seeing if in
the last few years this makeup of the RMB’s influence has changed. That is, we
will look to see if the RMB dominance is extended beyond the BRICS currencies.
With that said, the RMB dominance in these countries is extremely important. We
expect that as these countries continue to grow, so will the role of the RMB
internationally.
In addition to studying the influence of each major reserve currency, the
work also analyzed what factors play an important role in determining a
currency’s influence. What was found was that networking effects play a big role.
In addition the size of a country matters, and, as we stated before, China has seen
unprecedented growth in recent history. Finally debt levels hurt the size of blocs
and current account surpluses undermine them. These works lay the groundwork
for how our research will be conducted.

Methods
A. Data
Our work uses exchange rate data as reported by the International Monetary Fund
(IMF). The IMF has near global membership, as it is comprised of 189 countries.
The IMF’s main goal is to ensure the stability of the international monetary
system. They also provide reliable, up to date economic data. For exchange rate
data we use end of period monthly data reported by the IMF’s International
Financial Statistics. Our model uses exchange rates per USD for reasons
explained in the next section. To visualize the data that will be used for this
research, log scale exchange rates in terms of USD can be seen in Figure 2.
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Figure 2- Log scale end of period monthly exchange rates per USD for 2006M12018M11.
Source: IMF

We chose our time frame from 2006M1-2018M11 for multiple reasons.
First, we see very low correlation between the United States dollar and the
renminbi. We found the correlation to be .546, which is extremely encouraging
for the use of this time period in our results. This is especially true considering
that there were time periods where the RMB was directly pegged to the USD with
a perfect correlation of 1.This also implies this is actually a period of relatively
free floating for the renminbi backing up historical accounts. As we will discuss
later, this greatly helps to deal with the multicollinearity of our model. The second
reason we used this time period is that our work looks to paint an up to date
picture of the global influence of major currencies. Since China’s currency started
to become a large global player during this time, it is imperative that it is the
focus of our study. Finally, this allows for a large sample of countries with
complete data. We use a representative sample of 149 countries to estimate the
global influence of the reserve currencies. Countries whose data were incomplete
were removed from our sample. In addition, we argue our 155 data points are
sufficient to create a respectable sample size for the model.
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Our data for gross domestic product at purchasing-power parity (GDPPPP) are obtained from the IMF’s World Economic Outlook database. We use the
individual share of GDP-PPP an individual country has in a given year. This is
annual data reported at the end of each period. Our work uses the global shares of
GDP-PPP for 2018. This is to ensure that our results reflect the time period that
we are using, as well as to provide a clear scope of the current outlook.
B. Model
This work utilizes models employed by Tovar and Nor (2018). These models are
difference in log workhorse regression models that were initially used by Frankel
and Wei (1994). They are designed to analyze co-movement of international
currencies with the major reserve currencies. However, there were some
drawbacks to Frankel and Wei’s equation. Namely, the biggest problem was the
fact that the effects of the RMB were not measured. This at the time was
understandable, but as the RMB began to play the role of a major reserve
currency, it needed to be included. Therefore Tovar and Nor use a modified
approach used by Kawai and Pontines (2016). This model measured the effect of
the RMB. Kawai and Pontines’ model only focused on a localized region in Asia
in their analysis. Therefore, Tovar and Nor extended this model on the global
scale. They were the first researchers to do a global scale of this kind of analysis.
We will employ the same equation that Tovar and Nor used in their work. Our
work will then show an updated picture of the various reserve currencies on the
global scale in the age of Trump and post official recognition of the RMB as a
reserve currency by the IMF. The model is expressed in the following form:
Δlog(x/USD)t= β0 + β1Δlog(EUR/USD)t + β2Δlog(GBP/USD)t +
β3Δlog(JPY/USD)t + β4Δlog(RMB/USD)t + εt
(1)

where x is an individual country and USD serves as our choice for the numeraire
currency. Our dependent variable is the logarithmic change in of a country’s
currency in terms of the USD. The regression coefficients represent the weight
each major reserve currency has on currency x. Since we use difference in log we
can calculate the “inferred” United States effect. This is done by the constraint
β5 = 1 - β1 - β2 - β3 - β4.
Tovar and Nor (2018) use equation (1) throughout their work but express
collinearity problems with the RMB as it was pegged to the USD for a long
period of time. They address these problems by employing a second two-stage
model. In this work we use an alternative method to address these problems. That
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is, we use a sample period in which the RMB was not pegged to the USD. As
stated before, our period will range from 2006-2018. By choosing the USD as our
numeraire currency, as well as leaving it out of our initial model and calculating
the effect afterwards, we are able to alleviate the collinearity problem.
Our methods use a comprehensive list of 149 countries to create a
balanced sample to estimate effects. We will repeat equation (1) 149 times
running the regression once for each country in our sample. In each case we will
note the highest coefficient in the model. Country x will then be placed into the
reserve currency bloc for whichever has the highest coefficient. So by calculating
the weight of each reserve currency on each individual country we can calculate
the sphere of influence each reserve currency has. We obtain the size of reserve
currency blocs by assigning a country’s GDP-PPP reported by the IMF global
outlook data to the country whose reserve currency has the greatest influence on
that country’s currency, as found from the coefficients in (1).
Our methods serve as an alternative to traditional studies about reserve
currencies. Typical studies look mostly as shares of reserve currencies and factors
that affect reserve currencies. Our methods are beneficial in that we can measure
the direct effect the reserve currencies themselves have internationally. They are
also useful in that they not only paint a picture on the global scale with currency
blocs, but we can also point to individual countries and how each currency is
directly impacted. In addition, our methods allow for measuring the effect of the
RMB both prior to and post being officially recognized as a reserve currency by
the IMF in 2015.

Results
A. Global Impacts
Based on our regression results for each country individually we assigned global
shares of GDP-PPP to each reserve currency. These are known as currency blocs.
We constructed our reserve currency blocs in two ways. The first were absolute
currency blocs. This involved assigning each country to a reserve currency solely
based on which reserve currency accounted for the most movement in that
particular country’s currency. The next were relative currency blocs. In this case
each country’s global share of GDP-PPP was split between each of the major
reserve currencies based on the coefficients in each individual regression.
First we will discuss the absolute currency blocs. The results can be seen
in Table 1. About 5% of the global share of GDP-PPP was unaccounted for. This
is for two reasons. The first is that not every country had GDP-PPP data. The
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second is that not every country had complete data on exchange rates from 20062018. However we feel that this is a very good representation of the current state
of the international monetary fund. We find, like Tovar and Nor (2018), that the
international monetary system is now tri-polar. China has a strong foothold in the
global economy. Surprisingly we find that in this time period the United States
has a share of 31.21 which is less than the 40.7 Tovar and Nor found from 20112015. Interestingly we do not see an increased share for China. They found the
Chinese share to be 32.5 where we find it to be 30.07. It is Europe that sees the
increased share from 19.5 to 27.43. That leads us to believe that as the dollar loses
grip in the international monetary system, it will be the euro that makes up this
ground.

Absolute Share
Tovar and Nor
(2018)

US
31.2
40.1

Europe
27.4
19.5

China
30.1
32.5

Japan
4.2
4.8

UK
2.2
2.5

Table 1- Absolute currency bloc of global shares of GDP-PPP in percent (Approx.
5% of global GDP-PP is unaccounted for in our work)
We then turn to the relative currency blocs. The results can be seen in
Table 2. We see similar results as the absolute bloc in that there is a tri-polar
system. However, we see in this case that the US bloc is not the dominant one and
that in fact the Chinese bloc is. This is very surprising. However, we do not see
these results as reliable as the absolute blocs. This is mostly because they are
much more vulnerable to error in our estimations. For example in the relative bloc
we find Japan to have 3.22% of global GDP-PPP, however this is less than its
own GDP. This is because we are relying on the culmination of many
insignificant coefficients in which many appear as negative. This is opposed to
basing the blocs on strongly significant coefficients like we do for the absolute
bloc.

Relative Share
Tovar and Nor
(2018)

US
25.2
39

Europe
28.2
20.3

China
31.8
31.6

Japan
3.2
5.3

UK
6.8
4

Table 2- Relative currency bloc of global shares of GDP-PPP in percent (Approx.
5% of global GDP-PP is unaccounted for)
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Our results have major impacts on the global scale. Figure 3 shows a map
graph for each absolute currency bloc. Clearly neighboring countries are more
prone to being included in a major bloc, with some exceptions. This includes
Mexico and Canada which Tovar and Nor (2018) find to be in the US bloc. This
is another example of the decline of the Unites States global economic influence
in the past few years. It is clear that there are three major reserve currency blocs
and that the international monetary system in its current state is tri-polar.

Figure 3- Map graph of absolute major reserve blocs. Red represents the US,
yellow China, orange Europe, dark green UK, light green Japan, and white
countries do not have complete data.
We also have to consider the argument that we need to remove the
country’s own GDP-PPP from the bloc. By subtracting this out from the absolute
shares we see that the United States and Europe become virtually even at 16% of
global GDP-PPP. China goes to 11% and both the UK and Japan go to 0%. This
does not change the overall scope of our results. It does however, bode in favor of
Europe, which throughout this analysis has shown strong upticks in comparison to
the work of Tovar and Nor.
Conclusions
Our results show a tri-polar international monetary system. This is directly in line
with the results found by Tovar and Nor (2018). However, we see an increase in
the influence of the Euro over our time frame from 2006-2018 in addition to a
decrease in the dominance of the dollar. We see geographical changes such as
Canada and Mexico changing from the US bloc to the Euro bloc and Chinese bloc
respectively. We additionally found that the Chinese renminbi has a bloc of
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around 30% of the global share of GDP-PPP. Surprisingly with the recognition of
the Chinese RMB as a reserve currency in 2015, there does not seem to be a rise
in its sphere of influence attributable to that recognition. It is the Euro whose
influence seems to grow as the dollar’s influence falls. We find that in absolute
terms the United States still dominates the international monetary system, but in
relative terms its influence has declined.
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